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Abstract
Using panel data from 1996 to 2005, this paper shows that the e®ect of
government size on corruption is positive at a low level of democracy, but it
is negative at a high level. This ¯nding could ¯ll the gaps in previous studies
whose ¯ndings on the relationship between corruption and government size
are controversial.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is a main factor that hinders economic growth, reduces government's
legitimacy, and a®ects political stability across time and countries (e.g., Mauro,
1995 and La Porta et al., 1999). For this reason, searching for a mechanism to
determine corruption has been conducted by many studies, including Treisman
(2000), Serra (2006), Billger and Goel (2009) and Saha et al. (2009). Some exam-
ine corruption by considering government size. La Porta et al. (1999) conclude
that a large government has lower corruption level due to stronger checks and bal-
ances. On the other hand, Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that large government
¤Corresponding author: Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-
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a®ects bureaucracy e±ciency and increases corruption. More recently, Billger and
Goel (2009) examine the sensitivity of determinants to the conditional distribu-
tion of corruption across countries. Although they show that larger government
generally decreases corruption, but in the most corrupt countries, the e®ect is
insigni¯cant.
As seen from the above studies, the results on the e®ect of government size
on corruption are mixed. Based on the analysis of 140 countries' panel data
from 1996 to 2005, this paper contributes to the literature about corruption by
providing a new empirical analysis on the relationship between government size
and corruption. We consider the e®ect of the interaction between government
size and democracy, which has not been considered in previous studies to the
best of our knowledge. This approach is interesting because democracy is deemed
a factor that re°ects government transparency or a kind of yardstick to explain
the e®ect of government size on corruption. Since corruption is a severe problem
especially faced by developing countries, this study focuses on them. However,
we also provide the results of full countries sample for comparison.
2 Estimation Methodology and Data
To measure the e®ect of government size on corruption based on the level of
democracy, the estimation equation is speci¯ed as below:
corruptioni;t = ®0 + ®1govsizei;t + ®2democracyi;t (1)
+ ®3govsizei;t £ democracyi;t +X 0i;t¤ + "i;t;
where i and t are the country identity and the time series; govsize stands for
government size; X is a vector of the variables that may also in°uence the cor-
ruption; ¤ is a coe±cient vector; " is an error term. X includes the logarithms of
per capita GDP, the political stability, the economic freedom, the urbanization,
the regulatory quality and regional dummies.
From Eq. (1), the net e®ect of government size on corruption can be calculated
as follows:
¢corruptioni;t
¢govsizei;t
= ®1 + ®3democracyi;t: (2)
From Eq. (2), the impact of government size on corruption is a function of the
level of democracy. As previously mentioned, this paper focuses on developing or
non-OECD countries. However, we also conduct the estimation for the case of
full counties for comparison.
As for the data, this study utilizes annual data spanning from 1996 to 2005
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in 140 countries, 110 of which are non-OECD and de¯ned as developing coun-
tries. The sample period and the numbers of countries are selected based on data
availability. The data de¯nitions and sources are summarized in Table 1.
3 Empirical Results
Table 2 reports the estimation results in the developing countries. Columns (1),
(2) and (3) are the results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. In
column (1), the independent variables contain only government size, democracy
and their interaction term. The coe±cient of government size is insigni¯cant. This
may be due to the problem of omitted variables. To avoid this problem, to column
(2) we add variables that may in°uence corruption, as indicated by many previous
studies. The negative e®ects of income, political stability, economic freedom and
regulatory quality on corruption are consistent with such previous studies as La
Porta et al. (1999) and Treisman (2000). Column (3) shows the results when four
regional dummies are added simultaneously to control the time invariant regional
speci¯c e®ect.
Columns (4) and (5) report the results of ¯xed e®ects (FE) and random e®ects
(RE) estimations. Based on the Hausman test, FE estimation is preferable to RE
estimation. Note that FE estimation can solve the endogeneity problems at some
level if they arise from the correlation between country speci¯c and error terms.
Since FE estimation considers the country speci¯c e®ects, we can obtain the
unbiased coe±cients even if the unobserved country speci¯c term is correlated with
the error term. Hence, this paper concentrates on FE estimation. Since income,
economic freedom and regulatory quality have negative e®ects on corruption, it
is reasonable to judge that our FE estimation results are plausible.
Fig. 1 captures the e®ect of government size on corruption with the level of
democracy based on the FE estimation results for developing countries. Although
the pooled OLS results indicate that this e®ect is negative regardless of the level
of democracy, the FE estimation result suggests that it is positive at a low level
of democracy. One possible explanation is that, in less democratic countries,
the increase in government size may lead to more opportunities for rent seeking,
worsening the corruption level.
Additionally, for comparison, we also conduct estimation for the sample of
full countries. The results are presented in Table 3. Column (4) shows that
the coe±cients of income and economic freedom are not signi¯cant in this case,
but they are signi¯cant for developing countries. This result may re°ect that
income and economic freedom are not the determinants of corruption in developed
countries where income is already high and economic freedom is secured to some
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extent. Fig. 2 provides the result of the partial e®ects of government size on
corruption for full countries. Given Figs. 1 and 2, there is a possibility that
these e®ects are undervalued, particularly for countries with a medium level of
democracy.
Our above results provide evidence that the impact of government size on cor-
ruption can be positive or negative depending on the country's level of democracy.
This ¯nding might help ¯ll the gap in the previous studies that ¯nd controversial
results on the relationship between corruption and government size.
4 Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the relationship between government size and
corruption. Our estimation results suggest that the e®ect of government size on
corruption is positive at a low level of democracy and negative at a high level of
democracy. This ¯nding sheds light on how to explain the controversial ¯ndings of
previous studies on the relationship of corruption and government size. Although
panel estimation with instrumental variables is not considered in our estimation
methodology, the endogeneity problems are slightly improved by using ¯xed e®ects
(FE) estimation. Future work includes a more profound study using instrumental
variables.
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Table 2: Estimation results in developing countries
Dependent variable: Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government size -0.004 -0.011** -0.012*** 0.010** 0.008**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy -0.080*** 0.081*** 0.056** -0.012 0.034
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.023)
Government size democracy -0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.252*** -0.265*** -0.374* -0.460***
(0.058) (0.060) (0.217) (0.090)
Political stability -0.403*** -0.442*** 0.063 -0.136*
(0.060) (0.059) (0.084) (0.070)
Economic freedom -0.012* -0.006 -0.012* -0.012**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Urbanization -0.002 -0.005** 0.028 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.004)
Regulatory quality -1.030*** -1.003*** -0.280*** -0.460***
(0.123) (0.122) (0.108) (0.095)
Africa 0.158
(0.771)
Asia 0.239
(0.772)
Europe 1.028
(0.774)
Latin America 0.540
(0.772)
Constant 7.526*** 8.760*** 8.496*** 8.544*** 10.425***
(0.201) (0.562) (0.979) (1.354) (0.593)
Number of observations 686 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.175 0.711 0.740 0.201 0.654
Notes:
1. The asterisks ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% of signi¯cant levels.
2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 3: Estimation results in full countries
Dependent variable: Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Government size 0.010 0.000 0.003 0.009** 0.012***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Democracy -0.119*** 0.136*** 0.128*** -0.032 0.021
(0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022)
Government size democracy -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000* -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP per capita (ln) -0.424*** -0.484*** -0.039 -0.673***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.206) (0.091)
Political stability -0.541*** -0.515*** 0.032 -0.165**
(0.068) (0.065) (0.075) (0.068)
Economic freedom -0.019** -0.010 -0.009 -0.010*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Urbanization 0.000 -0.001 0.021 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.005)
Regulatory quality -1.028*** -0.994*** -0.310*** -0.473***
(0.133) (0.127) (0.094) (0.088)
Africa 1.099***
(0.267)
Asia 1.479***
(0.263)
Europe 1.953***
(0.250)
Latin America 1.725***
(0.263)
North America 0.713**
(0.340)
Constant 7.673*** 9.775*** 8.421*** 5.453*** 11.626***
(0.221) (0.607) (0.644) (1.378) (0.585)
Number of observations 998 707 707 707 707
R-squared 0.521 0.521 0.854 0.166 0.800
Notes:
1. The asterisks ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% of signi¯cant levels.
2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Figure 1: Partial e®ects of government size on corruption in developing countries
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Figure 2: Partial e®ects of government size on corruption in full countries
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